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Abstract: Controversial constitutional and institutional reforms voted in May in parliament 
opened the way for President Gnassingbé to stand for a fourth and fifth term (2020 and 2030) 
because the law does not apply retroactively. The first local elections since more than 30 years 
resulted in the victory of the ruling party. Grand expectations of the opposition which had hoped 
for a fundamental change at least at the grass-roots were again dashed. The human rights 
situation sharply deteriorated due to growing political and social tensions related to the 
prospects of the head of state running for a fourth term. Islamist terrorist violence spread from 
Mali to the northern frontier region of Togo. The autonomous deep-water port of Lomé 
developed as a growth pole and hub for the sub-region. China became the major partner beside 
the established partners the EU, France and Germany. The informal sector still dominated the 
economy. Economic freedom remained with the overall status ‘mostly unfree’. 
 
Résumé: Des réformes constitutionnelles et institutionnelles controversées votées en mai au 
Parlement ont ouvert la voie au président Gnassingbé pour se présenter aux quatrième et 
cinquième mandats (2020 et 2030) car la loi ne s'applique pas rétroactivement. Les premières 
élections locales depuis plus de 30 ans ont abouti à la victoire du parti au pouvoir. Les grandes 
attentes de l'opposition qui avait espéré un changement fondamental au moins à la base ont de 
nouveau été déçues. La situation des droits de l'homme s'est fortement détériorée en raison des 
tensions politiques et sociales croissantes, liées aux perspectives d'un quatrième mandat du chef 
de l'État. La violence terroriste islamiste s'est propagée du Mali à la région frontalière nord du 
Togo. Le port autonome en eau profonde de Lomé s'est développé comme un pôle de croissance 
et un hub pour la sous-région. La Chine est devenue le principal partenaire aux côtés des 
partenaires établis, l'UE, la France et l'Allemagne. Le secteur informel dominait toujours 
l'économie. La liberté économique est restée avec le statut global «pour la plupart non libre».  
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Domestic Politics  
 
The new year began with a government reshuffle following the victory of the ruling 
party Union for the Republic (Union pour la république, UNIR) in the legislative 
elections on 20 December last year. Although prime minister Komi Sélom Klassou had 
offered to resign because the victory of his party had been not as spectacular as 
expected, President Faure Gnassingbé reinstalled him again on 4 January in order to 
form the new cabinet. As announced on 25. January, Klassou made only slight 
modifications of his old team. Of the 23 ministers selected (four less than in the former 
government), 13 kept their portfolio, notably the politically most important, i.e. Yark 
Damehane (Security), Robert Dussey (Foreign Affairs) and Gilbert Bawara (civil 
service). Of the nine persons who newly entered the cabinet, the most remarkable was 
Kodjo Adédzé who changed from the powerful post of the General Commissioner of the 
Togolese Revenue Office to the Minister for Commerce and Industry which had been 
attributed additional competences. The new cabinet included five women, of whom the 
most remarkable was the newcomer Mme Demba Tignokpa for Planning and 
Development Cooperation. The most important chair of the minister for defence 
remained again with President Gnassingbé himself to shield-off any coup attempts. 
Apparently, the cabinet was still incomplete, because the chairs of important ministries, 
notably that of Agriculture, which will be decisive to implement this key sector in the 
National Development Plan 2018-2022, remained vacant.  
 
On 23 January, the deputy Mrs Yawa Tségan of the UNIR was elected president of the 
National Assembly. She replaced Dama Dramani (also UNIR). Tségan had held before 
the powerful office of the national inspector of taxes and was said to be very close to the 
Gnassingbé clan. This was the first time in the history of the Togolese parliament that a 
woman was elected as president of the parliament. Shortly before, during the legislative 
elections of 20. December 2018 (boycotted by the opposition coalition), altogether 15 
female deputies (16,5%, all of the ruling party) had been elected into the 6. legislature, a 
small reduction vis à vis the 17 women deputies in the previous parliament. 
 
On 8 May, the UNIR majority in parliament voted on the controversial proposals of the 
ruling party for constitutional and institutional reforms which allowed a maximum of 
two consecutive five-year presidential terms. The initial UNIR proposal of a mandate of 
seven years, renewable only once had been withdrawn after heated debates within the 
ruling political class. The vote on the new law passed with 90 out of 91 members to 
enact article 59 and further 28 articles of the Togolese constitution. Members of the 
National Assembly, as well as the senator's terms, were limited to three six-years, and 
members of the Constitutional Court to two six-years. For president Gnassingbé, who 
came into power in 2005, and had been re-elected twice in 2010 and 2015 by 
undemocratic elections, this meant in fact that he was allowed to stand for a fourth and 
fifth term (2020 and 2030) because the law does not apply retroactively. That 
disposition could only be modified by a referendum, which in fact opened already a 
loophole for a life-long prolongation of Gnassingbés rule. Last, but not least, the 
incumbent would be guaranteed immunity for life for acts performed during presidential 
terms. According to the new law, the president is elected by uninominal majority ballot 
in a two-round majority system and by the absolute majority of the votes cast.  
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Although the opposition coalition C14 (initially comprised of 14 opposition parties) had 
waged protest at varies diplomatic channels (including ECOWAS, EU and AU) as well 
as by big anti-government demonstrations in the past year, its resistance against this 
renewed usurpation of political power suffered from growing internal divisions. This 
had materialized first in dwindling popular support. The big anti-government 
demonstrations of 2018 had given way to rather weak protest on the streets of Lomé 
mobilising on 26. January distinctly fewer people. Moreover, the by far biggest 
opposition party, the National Alliance for Change (ANC, Alliance Nationale pour le 
Changement) of former opposition leader, Jean-Pierre Fabre, fell apart with the C14 
because of irreconcilable differences about its tactics and direction, followed suit by the 
established CAR (Comité d'action pour le renouveau) of former prime minister, Yawovi 
Agboyibo, and the new opposition party Pan-African National Party (PNP, Parti 
National Panafricain) of modernizer Tikpi Atchadam.  
 
However, it was clear beyond doubt that this state capture by the ruling party had been 
facilitated not only by a weak and disorganized opposition but also, if necessary, by 
brutal military repression of any opposition in the interest of the Gnassingbé clan, one 
of Africa’s oldest political dynasties. The latter could and would not accept any attempt 
to curtail its power for five decades. Thus, Togo will remain a dictatorship in disguise of 
an enlightened authoritarian regime for the foreseeable future.  
 
The long-expected first local elections for over 30 years (1987), reported many times, 
took finally place on 30 June. It was a proportional multi-member election using the 
strongest remainder method to replace the "special delegations" appointed by the 
President of the Republic, used up-to-date. The municipals were seen as an important 
step by all political parties because the local elected officials would be entitled to elect 
two-thirds of the future Senate. In fact, the new constitutional law provides in its article 
52: "The Senate is composed of : two thirds (2/3) of personalities elected by the 
representatives of the territorial collectivities; a third (1/3) of personalities designated by 
the President of the Republic.” Thereby, the common practice in Togolese politics of 
old politicians (both the barons of power and their historic opponents) to afford up to 12 
years of senatorial life, including all benefits that came with it, ceased to exist. In order 
to prevent politically motivated transboundary migration Togo's land borders with 
neighbouring countries, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Benin had been closed on election 
day. Yet, the pious wishes of the opposition which had hoped for a fundamental change 
at least at the grass-roots were again utterly dashed.  
 
Hitherto, the municipalities had neither benefited from real transfers of skills nor 
adequate structures. The local elections could guarantee a transfer of power for the first 
time. According to the new decentralization law of 2018, there exists only one type of 
communes in the country which is directed by locally elected delegates who constitute 
the municipal council. That is, the council has a state budget allocation as well as other 
endogenous resources through local taxation. With these funds, the municipalities can 
design, program and implement improvements within their territorial jurisdiction in the 
economic, cultural and social field. On 25 June, only a few days before the local 
elections, scheduled for June 30, the law on decentralization and local freedoms was 
amended by the modification of 33 articles in total and the introduction of five new 
ones. Basically, the new text establishes the limitation of the mandate of local elected 
officials to 6 years, renewable twice. Moreover, it stipulated that the countries’ 
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administration will be reorganized at two levels of local authorities, namely 
municipalities and regions. Thereby, the prefecture-level was abolished as a local 
authority but not as an administrative subdivision.  
 
For the 1.527 seats in the 117 municipalities, countrywide over 11.000 candidates, 
distributed over 643 lists, had registered for participation. Finally, a total of 570 lists of 
political parties and independents and 114 municipalities had been approved by the 
Supreme Court. Five municipalities, Oti-Sud 1, Bassar 4, Wawa 1, Zio 4, and Avé 2, 
did not take part in the polls for “technical reasons”. Of the opposition parties, the PNP 
did not take part, because its leader, Tikpi Atchadam, lived since 2017 in exile in fear of 
political persecution. He had demanded in vain the release of PNP’s detained activists, 
including three leaders imprisoned following demonstrations against the government on 
13 April. But except for the (PNP), all parties, that had boycotted the December 2018 
legislative elections, and thus had no longer any representation in Parliament, 
participated. Thus they hoped to establish a firm political presence at least at the local 
level.  
 
However, their dreams did not come true also in this respect. UNIR gained 65% of 
municipal councillor seats, i.e. 895 of 1490 seats, according to the provisional results, as 
proclaimed by the National Election Commission CENI on 5 July. The leader of the 
opposition-coalition C14, Brigitte Adjamagbo Johnson, contested the results because of 
multiple reports of the parties’ election observers on frauds like ballot stuffing and 
buying conscience. Already before the elections, the opposition had tried in vain to 
draw the attention of the international community on the alleged fraud, e.g. concerning 
the revision of the voters register on 16 to 19 May and the precipitation with which the 
election was organized which made that several voters had not sufficient time to 
register. However, the so-called ‘Group of 5’ (G5)3, composed of German, US, French, 
EU delegation embassies, as well as the coordination of the UN system in Togo, 
remained silent.  
 
As expected, the victory of UNIR had been especially huge in northern localities, the 
traditional fief of the ruling party. The oppositional ANC, the Opposition Coalition 
(C14), the Union of Forces for Change (UFC) and Nouvel Engagement Togolaise 
(NET) had to be content with 134, 131, 44, and 33 municipal councillors respectively.  
 
Also, the CENI reported deplorably low participation. Just 52,5% of the 3.466.524 
voters enrolled went to the polls, the lowest participation rate since the presidentials of 
2005 that brought Faure Gnassingbé to power. Participation was particularly low in 
Lomé where certain groups of the opposition had called for a boycott of the elections 
and the participation rate in the poll stations attributed to the opposition was on average 
below 25%. Apparently, the population had grown tired of the cumbersome registration 
and election procedures and/or developed growing fatalism vis à vis repeated attempts 
of the UNIR to remain in power whatever the cost. According to the CENI, altogether 
2.435 national election observer and 37 international election observer followed the 
electoral process that apparently passed off in calm without major incidences, with the 
exemption that three regime-critical NGOs the Association des chrétiens pourl 
                                                 
3
. Not to be confounded with the G6 (EU), a group of the largest West European countries nor the five 
nations which have joined together for an active role in the rapidly evolving international order (“Group 
of five”) or with G5 Sahel, an alliance of five countries in West Africa. 
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l’abolation de las torture (ACAT), the Concertation de la société civil au Togo (CNSC-
Togo) and the Commission épiscopale nationale justice et paix (CEJP) did not get their 
accreditation for observation. 
 
The by-elections in five remaining municipalities Oti-Sud 1, Bassar 4, Wawa 1, Zio 4, 
and Avé 2 on 15 August resulted in a majority for UNIR as well which got 42 of 63 
seats. The independent ‘Avé en marche’ got 6, the ANC 4 and the CAR 3 seats. 
 
The mayoral election in the municipality of Amou 2 (Amou-Oblo, in the prefecture of 
Amou, Plateaux Region) on 13 September brought another victory of UNIR, when the 
younger brother of the President, former project manager at the presidency and deputy 
of the National Assembly, Meyebine-esso Kwamé Gnassingbé, called Mey Gnassingbé, 
was unanimously elected mayor of Amou 2 by the 11 municipal councillors. 
 
On 6 December, the government fixed the date for the next presidential elections 22 
February 2020. In case no candidate would get the absolute majority, a second tour 
would be required. Formally, the mandate of Faure Gnassingbé which had started on 4 
May 2015 would end 3 May 2020. This would be the fourth successive vote with the 
incumbent Faure Gnassingbé contesting. The electoral campaign was scheduled to take 
place from 6 to 20 February. To participate, candidates would have to pay a deposit of 
20 m F CFA each. By End of November, already a dozen politicians had announced 
their candidature. Apart from the President, who had been prompted by the young turks 
and managerial staff of UNIR to contest, this concerned the leaders of major opposition 
parties, among them ANC-leader Jean-Pierre Fabre and Agbéyomé Kodjo, former prime 
minister of late Gnassingbé Eyadema, as well as independent candidates. One week 
before, the president of the CENI, Tchambakou Ayassor, had fixed the revision of the 
electoral list at the national level as well as the census of the 212.538 Togolese citizens 
in the diaspora entitled to vote from 29 November to 1 December 2019. The vote of the 
diaspora had been endorsed by parliament on 5 November the first time in the 
countries’ history.  
 
However, on 13 November the government decided that the Togolese diaspora, 
represented by the newly created Togolese High Council, organized by the government 
in Lomé, can only vote in six selected countries: France, United States, Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Gabon, Nigeria and Morocco. The numerous Togolese 
living in Germany, who had developed an especially critical stance against the ruling 
regime because most of them had been politically persecuted by the Gnassingbé 
dictatorship in the 1990s, were denied the right to vote. Over the past decades, hundreds 
of thousand Togolese refugees had migrated to Europe because of political persecution 
during the political crisis of the 1990s and 2005, notably to France and Germany. 
However, many of them had to return. End of 2018 only 10,870 migrants from Togo 
still lived in Germany. On the other hand, there was also immigration to Togo mostly 
for economic reasons. The migrant stock in Togo totalled 276,844 migrants (according 
to the latest available figures of 2015), most of them from neighbouring Benin, Ghana 
and Nigeria. On 1 August, 117 West African labour migrants, among them 43 Togolese, 
on passage to Gabon, were rescued at large of the sea-side town Kribi, South Cameroon 
from their damaged self-constructed zodiac, filled to overflowing. In Gabon exists a 
relatively strong Togolese community. The two countries had been connected by the 
common interest of their power elite to up-keep their autocratic Dynasties.  
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As usual, the security forces would be allowed to vote 72 hours before the general poll 
to assure the security of the voting process. Several opposition parties, as well as CSOs 
like the bishops of Togo, demanded on 13 November the suspension of the electoral 
process and the opening of a dialogue about their previous demands repeated several 
times in vain, i.e. to permit a re-composition of the Constitutional Court and the CENI 
and the creation of a reliable electoral list.   
 
On 28 November the cabinet adopted a decree to create a special force to secure the 
presidential election of 2020. This 'Security Force Presidential Election 2020’ 
(FOSEP) will be responsible for guaranteeing security before, during and after the 
presidential election and is placed under the supervision of the CENI. Already for the 
legislative elections of December 2018, an 8,000-unit (FOSE-2018) had secured the 
electoral process.  
 
 
 
 
 
According to the EIU, 2019 Democracy Index, Togo was still ranked among the 
‘authoritarian’ regimes, though among the countries with notable improvements, with 
an overall score of 3.30, global rank 126, and a regional rank 28, behind Ethiopia and 
before Niger. Neighbouring Ghana (6.63, 55, 5) and Benin ranked far better (5.09, 97, 
14). In the Freedom House’s 2019 Freedom in the World rating (published on 20 
January 2020) Togo ranked (for the year 2018) as ‘partly free’ and attained in Political 
Rights 5 of 7, Civil liberties 4 of 7 (1=Most Free, 7=Least Free)  and an aggregate score 
of 43 (least free: 0 – most free: 100).  
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In the UN World Happiness Report of 2019, Togo ranked 139 (2016-2018) on the 
ladder of 156 countries evaluated, behind Zambia and before Liberia; bordering Ghana 
(98) and Benin (102) again ranked far higher.  
 
Afrobarometer revealed that 85% of Togolese "agree" and "strongly agree" for a two-
term limit on the presidential mandate. However, the survey was outdated (2012), and 
whether this opinion referred also to a retroactive application of the two-term limit was 
not clear. 45% of the respondents felt that political leaders are more concerned with 
advancing their own ambitions. Besides, 43% expressed their dissatisfaction with health 
services in their country and gave the government poor marks for its performance in this 
sector. 
 
According to the African Governance Report for 2019 of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation 
Togo was the only country in which the Education Quality, which measures the quality 
of basic, secondary and tertiary institutions, had improved during the period 2014-2017 
(by +8.3)., while the Education Quality scores of other West-African countries like 
Ghana, Liberia, and Niger deteriorated by more than -15.0 points during the period 
2014-2017, only Togo has shown an improvement (+8.3). The same applied concerning 
the absence of undernourishment, the only indicator in Health exhibiting African 
average decline since 2014, with 26 countries registering deterioration. The largest 
improvements were made by Chad (+5.1), Djibouti (+3.4) and Togo (+3.3). Concerning 
the absence of Corruption in the Public Sector, for example, the latter improved by 
+2.4 points since 2014, with Egypt (+20.0) showing the largest progress, followed by 
Togo (+19.4) and Benin (+16.8). However, one has to bear in mind that they still all 
score below 50.0 out of 100.0. No progress had been made in the absence of Cross-
border Tensions. Most African countries (46) have seen no change in score. Yet, a 
negative trajectory is driven mainly by five countries, Lesotho, DRC (both -50.0), 
Burundi, Djibouti and Togo (-25.0 each). Whereas Gender had improved every single 
year since 2014, in 19 countries it deteriorated, with an especially pronounced year-on-
year deterioration for Guinea-Bissau and Togo. The same applied concerning the access 
to Justice. While 30 countries have improved their score since 2014, it deteriorated in 
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24 other, including Namibia (-12.4), Togo (-12.0) and Comoros (-10.8) that observed 
the largest decline.  
 
According to an report of Amnesty International on the human rights situation in 
Togo to be presented at the UN-Human-Rights-Committee 2 to 27 March 2020, the 
human rights situation in Togo sharply deteriorated due to growing political and social 
tensions related to the prospects of the head of state running for a fourth term and the 
contested 2019 constitutional reforms. Moreover, laws were revised to further curtail 
peaceful dissent. Thus, Lomé failed to revise its criminal procedure code to build in fair 
trial standards and legal safeguards against torture and other ill-treatments. Last, but not 
least, the government adopted legislation which does not meet international human 
rights standards, including the 2019 law on national security, the 2019 law on 
assemblies and the 2018 law on cybersecurity. At any rate, the Constitutional revision 
of 2019 enabled the President of the National Human Rights Commission to seize the 
Constitutional court to assess the constitutionality of laws passed by parliament (Article 
104).  
 
The harassment of journalists and media continued. On 19 January, the Criminal 
Court of Lomé sentenced activist Folly Satchivi of the CSO ‘En aucun cas’ (‘Under No 
Circumstances’) to 36 months in prison, with 12 months suspended, for “rebellion”, 
“apology of crimes and offences” and “aggravated public disorder”. He had been 
arrested on 22 August 2018 while attempting to hold a press conference on the 
crackdown on protests. On 10 October 2019, the Court of Appeal reduced his sentence 
to 28 months in prison, with six months suspended. He was released on 16 October 
following a presidential pardon. On 13 April, the Panafrican National Party (PNP) of 
Tipki Atchadam organized nationwide protests to call for constitutional reforms. These 
protests were banned by the Ministry of Territorial Administration, except in Lomé, 
Afagnan and Sokodé, on the grounds that they would “undermine public order”. They 
were dispersed by security forces using tear gas and batons. Dozens of protesters and 
bystanders were injured. At least one man died during demonstrations in the northern 
town of Bafilo. At least 30 people were arrested during the 13 April protests and 19 
were sentenced to 24 months imprisonment, with suspended sentences ranging from 12 
to 24 months, for aggravated public disorder. Following the protests, at least three PNP 
leaders were also arrested, including the PNP treasurer Sébabé Guéffé Nouridine, the 
permanent secretary Kéziré Azizou and the special advisor Ouro-Djikpa Tchatikpi. 
Nouridine and Azizou were accused of rebellion, assault, and not respecting the ban and 
restrictions on protests’ itineraries. On 7 May, they were sentenced to 24 months in 
prison, with suspended sentences of 12 to 24 months, respectively. Tchatikpi was 
released on bail on 10 August. 
 
On 25 March, the High Authority for Audiovisual and Communication (Haute Autorité 
de l’Audiovisuel et de la Communication, HAAC) withdrew the license of the 
newspaper La Nouvelle because it published "unverified information", incited ethnic 
and religious hatred, abused the privacy of citizens. On 15 October, two pro-democracy 
activists from the CSO Tournons la page Niger (Turn the Page Niger, TLP Niger) and 
TLP Côte d’Ivoire were denied access to Togo.  
 
In August, the parliament passed a law on national security which enabled the 
Minister of Territorial Administration, in some cases even local authorities, to order 
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house arrests, identity controls and interpellations of up to 24 hours. Besides, they had 
the right to evict foreign nationals, to ban assemblies, suspend associations, and close 
establishments, including places of worship, hotels and “other meeting places”. The law 
also allowed the Minister of Territorial Administration to order the removal of or 
blocking access to internet online content and to shut down online communications.  
 
On 2 September, the High Commission for Reconciliation and Strengthening National 
Unity (Haut Commissariat pour la réconciliation et le renforcement de l’unité nationale, 
HCRRUN) disbursed nearly 7 bn F CFA (10.68 m €) to compensate 7,660 victims of 
political violence instigated by the security services in the past decades. The HCRRUN 
had been installed in 2015 on the recommendation of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (‘Commission Vérité, Justice et Réconciliation’, CVJR).  
 
Togo’s 12 prisons remained overcrowded. The Togolese Human Rights League (Ligue 
togolaise des droits de l’Homme, LTDH) blamed slow court cases and procedures, 
arbitrary arrests as well as the detention of petty offenders without the option of bail 
among the factors causing prison congestion. According to an official census, in 
December 5,352 people were detained (3.2% female detainees) despite a total prison 
capacity of only 2,881. 62% of all prisoners were still awaiting trial, half of them had 
not even been charged. At the Lomé civil prison, detainees frequently had to pay 16,000 
F CFA (25 €) or more to have a place to sleep if they could afford it, or else they would 
be forced to spend the night sitting between each other's legs due to overcrowding. 
Detainees often had no access to adequate medical care, were given only one meal a day 
and had no access to a lawyer. At least 267 prisoners died in detention between 2012 
and 2019, mostly from preventable or curable diseases, including malaria and intestinal 
infections.  
 
The intolerable prison conditions might have instigated a wave of prison outbreak 
attempts. On 3 June there was a mutiny or a break-out attempt at Tsévié prison. 
According to the CNDH, the security agents counted a dozen wounded, including 7 who 
had to be evacuated to hospital. Only a few days after the Tsévié prison break-attempt, 
the same passed at the prison of Vogan (located 57 kilometres northeast of Lomé). 
Three months before, on 18 March about 30 prisoners at the Dapaong civil prison (at 
the northern border to Burkina Faso) had tried to escape as well. 12 could be 
apprehended while 18 were still running.  
 
Child labour still exists in Togo. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms 
of slavery revealed on 7 June in Dakar that an estimated 50,000 people were treated as 
slaves among the 7,4 m people of the country. Thereby, Togo ranks 45
th
 out of 167 
countries on the Modern Slavery Index. Many children had been forced into domestic 
servitude or hard labour, driven by poverty and cultural tradition of 'confiage’ which 
involves sending a child to a relative or friend to attend school in a larger town or city. 
This could place children at risk of exploitation by internal human trafficking. Parents 
are often complicit in child trafficking, and many traditional chiefs and leaders do not 
discourage the practice. On the contrary, boys, known as talibés, are sent to Koranic 
schools for education and subsequently forced by their teachers to beg in the streets. 
 
Moreover, transnational migration of children in search of labour or out of cultural 
reasons is common not only in Togo but in the whole of West Africa. A project of Terre 
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des Hommes registered about 7 million migrant children (November 2018) in the 
corridor Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Bénin and Nigeria, including about 1 m children 
from Togo. In April, Interpol rescued 157 child slaves from neighbouring Benin and 
Nigeria. 
 
In April there were alarming reports, based on Burkinabe intelligence, about jihadists 
hunted down in eastern Burkina Faso to have taken refuge in Northern Togo, Benin, and 
Ghana. The UN reported on 19 February that more than 100,000 refugees had been 
internally displaced by factional fighting in the country, 60,000 of whom after an 
upsurge in fighting in January. Islamist terrorist violence had spread from Mali over 
the past years, where the violence had killed thousands and displaced hundreds of 
thousands. In fact, it was rampant in the whole Sahel region since decades, fuelled by 
local grievances between local resident peasants and militant Fulani herdsmen. Ethnic 
militias linked up with jihadists exploiting communal tensions. This comprised groups 
of armed men on motorbikes, including minors in possession of large sums of money. 
Most of the terrorists hunted down in April in the border-region of Ghana, Togo and 
Benin were returned to Burkina Faso. However, in May a Benin tourist guide had been 
killed during the kidnapping of two French tourists in the Pendjari National Park near 
the Burkina border. Jihadists also ambushed a vehicle crossing the border from Togo 
and murdered a Spanish Catholic missionary. In recent times there were growing attacks 
on Christian communities on both sides of the border by Islamist terrorists demanding 
the communities to convert to Islam. These incidences showed that the jihadists were 
still rampant in the region. The Sahelo-Saharan organisation Community of Sahel-
Saharan States (CEN-SAD) founded in 1998, joined by Togo in 2002, met on 13 April 
in Chadian capital N'Djamena, to hold its first summit since 2013. The summit focused 
on the growing security challenges, notably Islamist terrorism and drug trafficking, as 
well as on security risks of the porous borders and inadequate security presence in 
remote areas. In July, a new mixed contingent of 140 Togolese security forces was 
deployed to Mali as part of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission 
in Mali (MINUSMA). Shortly before, up to 20 June, the joint forces of Egypt and Togo 
staged an anti-terrorist exercise at the Egyptian Mohamed Naguib Military Base, the 
largest military base in the Middle East, constructed in 2017 and located close to the 
port city of Alexandria near Alexandria. It was the second exercise of Sahel countries 
that had been organized by Egypt the precedent had been joined by Sudan, Nigeria and 
Burkina Faso. On 14 September the ECOWAS announced at its summit in 
Ouagadougou a US$1bn plan to combat terrorism in West Africa during 2020-24.  
 
The president of the Togolese Muslim Union (UMT), El Hadji Inoussa Bouraïma, 
called on his fellow believers to stand up against all forms of terrorism during the 
celebration of Eid al-Fitr. Later-on, 21 November, a large joint common security 
operation within the framework of the fight against terrorism and cross-border 
criminality, called Koudanlgou III, led to the arrest of 427 suspects at the Togo-
Ghanaian border in five regions of Northern Ghana and the Savanes region of Togo, 
comprising 333 Ghanaians and 94 other nationalities. Whereas the Ghanaians were tried 
before Ghanaian courts, the 25 foreigners from Burkina-Faso, 2 from Benin, 6 from 
Cote D'Ivoire, 9 Nigerians and 3 Togolese were put before the court and repatriated to 
their respective countries. A total of 3,000 troops made up of 1,800 from Ghana and 
1,200 from Togo had been involved in this exercise.  
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Foreign Affairs  
 
The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA; ZLECA or ZlEC, in French) which 
had been signed also by Togo in March 2018 was ratified on 9 January 2019 and 
deposited 2 April. It is a key element of the AU’s ambitious Agenda 2063 and had been 
heralded as a milestone for regional integration and continental unity, leading ultimately 
to a future African Economic Community (AEC). The latter would be the last of six 
successive stages that involve sectoral cooperation, strengthening Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) and finally a continental customs union, a common market and a 
monetary and economic union. On 30 May the AfCFTA, which had been signed so far 
by 52 of the 55 African Union (AU) member states, came into force legally, ahead of a 
planned launch of a continental single market on 7 July. As of December, there were 28 
ratifying countries and 54 signatories. The AfCFTA got international financial support 
for instance from the EU (€ 50m for 2018-20) for facilitating its implementation. 
 
Yet, there were still serious limiting factors of regional integration, like the poor 
infrastructure development, the large informal sector, contested rules of origin and other 
non-tariff barriers to trade. Last but not least, lacking political will to yield sovereignty, 
missing sense of regional identity, trust and common interests will impede the 
implementation because they had been identified already before as major causes of poor 
performing regional institutions. The latter is in the end only what individual member 
states wish them to be. Repeated resurgence of pan-Africanism since the early days of 
African independence in the 1960s, and the call for African Renaissance in the 1990
th
, 
have been countered by new waves of nationalism impeding effective regional 
integration. In short, the AfCFTA is based on high-flying visions indeed given the 
ambiguous progress of regional integration since the surge of African RECs in the 
1970s and the varying commitment of governments to support it. While characterized 
by ambitious targets, they have had a dismally poor implementation record.  
 
Moreover, the ethics of integration in Africa concerned mainly an elite-driven process 
of regional and continental integration. That is, a discreet policy of integration, pushed 
by governments and background lobby groups of major economic players, is involved. 
In this respect, the ethics of African integration resemble that of European 'integration 
by stealth’ (an expression coined by Bellamy & Warleigh). That is, in the early phase of 
integration the general public has been treated largely as passive and acquiescent. 
However, the newly created institutions and forums of integration and conflict 
resolution provided also for an ongoing and gradual shift of loyalty of national elites to 
new supra-national (regional and continental) centres of decision and created thereby 
additional trans-national arenas of power-play with repercussions on the national and 
sub-national level. Guidelines for ethical leadership in Africa would have to respect the 
actual cross-cultural commonalities and differences of the multitude of 'ethics brewed in 
the African pot’. 
 
Following Togo's first axis its national development plan (2018-2020, PND) and to 
make the nation a logistics hub in the Gulf of Guinea as well as a first-class business 
centre in West Africa, Lomé confirmed on 15 May the country’s adhesion to the 
international maritime transport convention which it had signed already in London on 9 
April 1965. The convention aims at simplifying administrative procedures related to the 
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arrival, stay and departure of ships, in the framework of international trips and to get 
more overseas partners to implement its PND. Thereby it not only profited by its 
excellent strategic geographical location but also by its deep-water port of Lomé, with 
16,60 meters the only deep-water port on the West African coast that can accommodate 
3
rd
 generation ships. In the same vein, it ratified the 1988 protocol on load lines relating 
to the international convention on load lines of 1966, to ensure ships’ safety, by 
preventing overloading and to boost maritime trade and security.  
 
In recent years the autonomous port of Lomé had already overtaken Lagos as West 
Africa’s leading port. Thanks to the harbour’s modernization and the politics of 
commissioning the Lomé container terminal (LCT) to Bolloré Africa Logistics 
4
that 
handles about 75% of containers shipped, the Port of Lomé tripled its capacity from 
311,500 twenty-foot containers (TEU) in 2013 to 1,1 m in 2017. Togo’s port also 
services neighbouring landlocked countries Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. According to 
the Dutch shipping information services Dynamar, the West African container cargo is 
expected to grow by 5% p.a. to reach 4,3 m TEU by 2021. Nigeria’s Apapa port in 
Lagos (1 m TEU), on the other hand, lost in the past five years about 30% of its 
container traffic due to chronic congestion, poor quality of services and increasing 
insecurity. The Ghanaian Tema port, for long the second behind Lagos, dropped to the 
third position with 956,400 TEU, before Abidjan (663,600 TEU).  
 
However, the port of Cotonou in neighbouring Benin, a long-time competitor to Lomé 
port as well, gained a competitive edge when Benin and Niger signed on 23 January a 
bilateral agreement to build a new US$ 2 to US$ 4 bn 2,000 km oil-export pipeline 
between the two countries to export Niger's crude oil from the oil fields of Agadem. 
Thereby, the countries’ current production of about 20,000 b/d was expected to rise to 
estimated 110,000 b/d by 2021 and possible 200,000 b/d at long-term. Benin would 
profit from the transit-fees. The pipeline which has been lauded as a model of South-
South cooperation will be managed by the China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC), that extracts the oil already since 2011, with the participation of the 
governments of the two concerned countries. The construction is subject to prior 
environmental impact studies. The competitive project of an alternative pipeline through 
Chad and Cameroon had been dropped due to Chad’s political instability, the growing 
terrorist threat, limited capacity and other technical and financial problems. 
 
Because of increasing threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, drug-trafficking, and 
illegal fishery in the Gulf of Guinea, the EU, pushed by Paris and London that had a 
long-standing interest in protecting international maritime traffic to their former 
colonies in the Gulf, promised the co-funding of regional maritime security to the tune 
of € 155 m (US$ 173 m) during the ECOWAS’ maritime stakeholders meeting in the 
Nigerian capital, Abuja on 8 May. According to the International Maritime Bureau, the 
                                                 
4
 On 19 July the French magazine ‚Le Point‘ revealed the outcome of the lawsuit against Bolloré before 
the Paris Court of Appeal. The latter recognized the prescription of the facts of "corruption" and "forgery 
and use of forgery" in Guinea, facts for which Bolloré and his group were prosecuted. Besides, the French 
billionaire remained charged with breach of trust in this same Guinean case, and for the second part of the 
investigation which concerns similar accusations in the Togolese case. On 24 April 2018, Vincent Bolloré 
had been placed in police custody in Nanterre, to answer accusations of "bribery of a foreign public 
officials” (among them the Togolese head of state), and to determine whether the Bolloré group used its 
political advisory activities, via its Havas subsidiary, to manage the ports of Lomé in Togo and Conakry 
in Guinea.  
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Gulf of Guinea is still the most dangerous region for international seafarers due to 
piracy. This was confirmed by ECOWAS which stated that its member states lose US$ 
2 bn p.a. to illegal fishing and other forms of resource theft, such as oil-theft by militant 
groups such as Nigeria's Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, illegal 
trade in tropical hardwoods, etc. off the Gulf coast. The EU move was complemented 
by the NATO Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade – Gulf of Guinea (MDAT-GoG) 
that provides a 24-hour manned service of military experts and guidance on vessel 
operating patterns as well as security risks within the Gulf of Guinea. On 4 November, a 
big crude-oil tanker ‘Elka Aristotle’ (94,143 t DWT) flying the Greek flag, had been 
attacked about 18 km of the Togolese the port of Lomé by armed pirates who took four 
crew member as hostages and injured one. 
 
ECOWAS – West African neighbours 
 
Togo and Burkina Faso signed 14 cooperation agreements on 8 October, including one 
on trans-border military cooperation, during a meeting of the 3
rd
 session of the Great 
Mixed Cooperation Commission between the two countries in Lomé. On 10 October the 
Togolese government adopted a law Project to ratify the AU-convention on 
cybersecurity that had been adopted on 27 June 2014 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. 
 
On 20 August the Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari surprisingly closed Nigeria's 
borders and suspended imports and exports across all of Nigeria’s land borders. His 
primary goal was to stop rampant informal trade and smuggling from Togo and Benin 
across the notorious porous frontiers. Shortly before, on 24 June, the Nigerian 
government had warned already Ghana and Togo to stop attacking Nigerian traders in 
their countries who had been maltreated because of accusations of unfair competition 
and lawbreaking. The ‘partial closure’ (maritime export, e.g. of crude oil, was excluded) 
was considered an early warning sign for the African free trade deal’s optimism 
concerning the AfCFTA. It was also inconsistent with Nigeria’s commitment since 
1975 to guarantee free trade within the ECOWAS. Yet, to the government in Abuja, the 
border shut-down, and the introduction of protective duties served also the interest of 
Nigeria’s agricultural producers and infant (agro) industries as well as the interests of 
the Nigerian consumers. The closure that had no timeline for reopening the borders, not 
only had devastating effects on neighbouring Benin and Togo, key exporters of 
foodstuffs to Nigeria, but it also pushed up prices for staples such as rice at markets 
around Nigeria. It was especially hard for Togo’s tomato producers and their Nigerian 
clients because the tomatoes rotted during transport at the frontier. It was not the first 
time Nigeria's borders with Benin (including trans-border trade from Togo and Ghana), 
Niger, Chad and Cameroon have been closed. In April 1984, the Government closed 
them already to combat the black market in the country's ailing currency, to tackle its 
balance of payments difficulties and to stabilize its currency, the naira. Only one year 
later, in May 1985, the borders were re-opened again, mainly to expulse 700,000 illegal 
immigrants mostly from Ghana who had been attracted to Nigeria in part by the oil 
boom in the 1970s, but 1985, when the country suffered under deep economic problems 
and an increasing crime rate, attributed in large measure to the immigrants, they were 
chased out. 
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China is one of Togo’s major export partners (15.4% of total exports) alongside 
Burkina Faso (16.6%)
5
. The Port of Lomé had been envisaged as a hub of China’s Belt 
and Road Initiative (BRI) in West-Africa and beyond. The traditionally close relations 
between China and Togo were re-enforced when a Togolese follow-up group for the 
past Forum on China-Africa  Cooperation (FOCAC, 2018) visited Peking on 26 June, to 
track potential partnerships and investments. The headquarters of the China Road and 
Bridge Corporation were of special interest because that construction group had been 
keen to handle Togo’s transport corridor project falling under Togo’s national 
development plan. It centres on the construction of a new heavy haul railway line of 
about 760 km, in combination with upgrades for road and telecommunication 
infrastructure systems, extending from the Port of Lomé to the Northern border post of 
Cinkasse on the borders with Burkina Faso and Ghana. It lies about 38km from 
Dapaong and is proposed to be the location of a so-called ‘dry port’. The only existing, 
but outdated railway finishes at Blitta, some 400 km south of Cinkasse. It ceased 
operations mid-1990. The new railway will complement the Tema - Ouagadougou 
mainline in neighbouring Ghana to which it will constitute in fact a modern and more 
performant alternative, connecting sea-ports of the Bight of Benin to the hinterland. The 
Chinese long-time partner also built major road infrastructures such as the Lomé and 
Alédjo bypasses as well as the 60 km Lomé-Vogan-Anfoin road project in Southern 
Togo and rehabilitated the Amakpapé Bridge over the Haho river in the Plateau region, 
about 75 km north of Lomé on the national highway No. 1, that collapsed during the 
floods of 2008, a transport bottleneck for northern Togo.   
 
On 24 April, President Gnassingbé inaugurated the new administrative services centre 
for the education-, health-, and agriculture ministries in the Lomé II area, near the new 
presidential office, constructed by the Shanghai Construction Group for around US$ 31 
m. Additional seven major Chinese construction projects, promised during the FOCAC-
meeting, were still in the pipeline. On 18 November, the University of Lomé launched a 
new Faculty of Chinese Language Studies in collaboration with the Confucius Institute. 
The latter had trained already thousands of Chinese language students over the past 
decade, most of them since worked as interpreters or translators in Togo and the 
neighbouring countries. Its services meet growing demand. For the first semester of the 
academic year of 2019, about 600 students registered in the Institute, compared to 300 
enrolments five years earlier. Their high demand is explained by a deepening China-
Togo, given the growing presence of Chinese firms which create jobs to Chinese-
speaking young Togolese students. The Chinese Language Faculty will allow students 
to receive official bachelor degrees after successfully completing their Chinese language 
courses. 
 
Since the resumption of EU cooperation in 2007, state consolidation and regional 
security had been in the focus of cooperation. For the past 7 years, the EU had been the 
major development partner of Togo, granting in total more than € 270 m, including 
€216 million for the 2014-2020 period of the 11th European Development Fund (EDF). 
                                                 
5
 According to the latest available figures Togo’s imports from China amounted to US$ 492,38 m (2016), 
US$ 317,06 m (2017) mostly agricultural imports, its exports to US$ 105,33 m (2016), US$ 73,18 m 
(2017) and US$ 145,76 m (2018), mostly palm nuts, cereals and pineapple (foreign trade, all products, 
ITC Trade-Map, 2020).  – Togo’s imports from Burkina Faso added up to US$ 4,09 m (2016) and 7,38 m 
(2017), its exports US$ 116,46 m (2016), US$ 122,21 (2017), and US$ 129,88 m (2018), the latter mostly 
phosphate, clinker and cement.   
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From 13 to 14 June the first Togo-EU Economic Forum, labelled 'Le Rendez-vous des 
opportunites' had been held in Lomé, to mobilise higher levels of private investment in 
priority sectors in Togo. At the end of the year (3.12.) the EU disbursed € 17 m for the 
current year within the framework of the EU grant of € 33 m for 2019-2020 to support 
the PND. Also, nearly all West-African regional EU development projects benefited 
Togo either directly or indirectly. Thus, the regional food-reserve project (€ 56 m) was 
of particular interest, because two of its four components (total € 34.5 m) were 
implemented by the Regional Agency for Food and Agriculture (ARAA, the ECOWAS 
food agency) based in Lomé. On 24 June the Togo-EU chamber of commerce 
(EUROCHAM-Togo) chaired by Charles Kokouvi Gafan, the CEO of the notorious 
Bolloré Transport & Logistics Togo, was officially launched. Already on 13 April, 
Tony Blair, former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1997 to 2007, had been 
contracted as coach of President Gnassingbé to consult the government in fulfilling the 
aims of the PND.  
 
Apart from the EU, France and Germany were the most important bilateral partners of 
Togo because of their historic links to their former colony. Yet, foreign trade relations 
with France in the past years remained by far more important than with Germany, 
though inferior to China’s foreign trade with Togo6. The long-time special relations 
between France and Togo were confirmed by support from French military 
cooperation. On 5 February, instructional material for the Training Center for 
Peacekeeping Operations (CEOMP) had been handed over. The centre, created in 2008, 
has the mission of preparing Togolese contingents before their deployment in 
peacekeeping operations: 1400 Togolese soldiers are permanently serving under the UN 
blue helmet to MINUSMA and UNAMID mainly. On March 22, a new military 
obstacle course for student officers of the National School of NCOs in Témédja (ENSO-
T) was established, to complete the French contribution to the ramp-up of this school, 
created 5 years ago as part of Franco-Togolese defence cooperation.  
 
According to a survey by Afrobarometer on the much-criticised F CFA currency, 
published on 13 February, two out of three Togolese believed that the CFA should be 
replaced. 66% responded that “the currency profits  France more than members of the 
Franc zone such as Togo”. The richest and most educated among the surveyed were 
most hostile to the neo-colonial currency (73%). Accordingly, eight West African 
nations, adopted at a meeting of Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) in November a proposal to withdraw their currency reserves from the 
French central bank, evoked controversial reactions. The proposal was an outcome of 
the long-standing controversy on the ill-adapted and increasingly anachronistic CFA 
franc, harshly condemned as neo-colonial heritage by internationally renowned (former) 
African officials and critics of the CFA franc, including Togo’s Kako Nubukpo, ex-
officer at the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) and former Togolese 
minister. Already in July, the leaders of the sub-region had adopted a proposal to 
introduce a single currency, labelled ‘eco’, for the entire region by 2020. In the first 
phase, countries with their own currencies (Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone) are to launch the eco. In a second phase, the eight UEMOA (West African 
Economic and Monetary Union) member countries that have in common the CFA franc 
                                                 
6
 According to the latest available trade statistics Togo’s bilateral exports to France amounted to US$ 
17,65 m (2017), US$ 23,28 m (2018) and US$ 125,6 m (2019), and its imports to US$ 175,61 (2017) m 
(ITC Trade-Map, 2020).  
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(Ivory Coast, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mali, Togo, Niger, Benin and Guinea-Bissau) 
would follow-suite. Even though these eight West African countries had gained 
independence years ago, they continued to vest their foreign exchange reserves with the 
French central bank. Now they decided to vest the reserves with the Senegal-based 
Central Bank of West African States. Ghana, that had expressed its determination to 
join the ‘eco’ on 29 December, although it did not belong to the CFA-zone, but had its 
own currency the cedi, urged the members of the currency union to ditch a planned peg 
to the euro.  
 
Furthermore, Togo’s foreign affairs minister Robert Dussey had been selected in 2019 
as the ACP’s chief negotiator for negotiations on the post-Cotonou treaty in 2020. He is 
seen by many in Brussels as an ally of Paris.  
 
German development cooperation with Togo, which had resumed in late 2012, 
continued in the following priority areas: decentralisation and good governance, rural 
development and agriculture, and sustainable economic development with a focus on 
vocational training and youth employment. Within the framework of these programs, 
the promotion of decentralization processes in Togo (ProDeGoL) continued because of 
the local elections of 30 June. Besides, a support project to improve the competitiveness 
of the pineapple industry in Togo was launched in Adangbé on 17 January, co-financed 
by Germany and the EU for € 1.25 m and € 4.7 m respectively over four years. The last 
intergovernmental negotiations on development cooperation took place in Lomé in 
March. In the following summer, a Togo-European Union Economic Forum was held in 
Lomé. German development cooperation commitments since 2012 amounted to up to € 
181.4 m. Moreover, Germany development aid is involved in sub-regional programs 
like the West African Power Pool including the rehabilitation of the Nangbeto 
hydropower plant, environmental protection and the preservation of biodiversity. 
However, development by trade, according to the neo-liberal call for 'trade not aid' was 
still insignificant
7
. 
 
Despite the little attention which President Trump had shown for Africa up to now, the 
assistant secretary for the US State Department's Bureau of African Affairs, Tibor 
Nagy, confirmed on 12 August the US's commitment towards trade and investment in 
Africa 
8
. This, however, just in passing, at the AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity 
Act) Forum in Abidjan. The USA had already reacted on 5 October 2018 to the 
increasing economic and political influence of China in Africa, notably to the China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), by passing a US$ 60 bn agency, the Better Utilisation of 
Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act. It is meant to fund development 
projects in favoured countries. Paralleled by the EU's Connectivity Strategy, the BUILD 
Act means that African countries could now benefit from several pools of development 
assistance owing to US-Sino-European competition. Yet, this surge in global ‘aid 
competition’ was not restricted to the USA, countries as India, the Arab states of the 
Persian Gulf states, Turkey 
9
 and Russia 
10
 took part in the race as well. India, too, 
                                                 
7
 Total bilateral exports of Togo to Germany amounted to US$ 3,69  m (2016), US$ 2,77 m (2017), and 
US$ 7,06 m (2018) and its imports to US$ 48,99 m (2016) US$ 50,63 m (2017). 
8
 Bilateral trade with Togo amounted to Togo's export to the US of US$ 15,32 m (2017), US$ 13,78 m 
(2018) and US$ 13,70 (2019); its imports to US$ 32,46 m in 2017.   
9
 Turkey’s foreign trade with Togo was on about the same low level as that of Russia. Togo’s exports to 
Turkey amounted to US$ 12 m (2017), US$ 17 m (2018) and US$ 11 m (2019), its imports to US$ 27 m 
(2017). 
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counted among the top trading partners of Togo. Total bilateral trade in the period 2018-
2019 amounted to US$ 998 m (Togo’s imports US$ 694 m, exports US$ 304 m). Thus, 
Togo’s foreign trade with India was on about the same level as that with China. 11 
 
From 23 to 24 October Faure Gnassingbé and his delegation attended the first-ever 
Russia-Africa summit in Sochi, Russia, to attract investments for the PND 2018-2022.  
 
 
Socioeconomic Developments  
 
According to the most recent country-wide business survey conducted by the national 
statistics institute (INSEED) in January and March 2018, released on 24 June 2019, 
more than 85% of business in Togo operates in the informal sector. The Lomé region 
hosted by far the most businesses (63,4%), the Plateau region followed far behind 
(10,1%), the Maritime region (outside Grand Lomé) (8,3%), Kara (6,8%), the Central 
region (6%) and Savanes region (5,4%). Therefore, the following official figures on 
economic growth and development should be interpreted with caution, because much of 
activities in the informal sector remain unrecorded. 
 
On 19 September, the government adopted the 2019 management finance bill that 
brought the national budget to nearly US$ 2.5 bn, an increase of 2.8%. An amending 
finance bill, management 2019, allowed the government to readjust expenditure 
forecasts according to the revenue initially expected. It was projected at F CFA 1,501.9 
bn (US$ 2.524 bn) against F CFA 1,461 bn (US$ 2.455 bn) in the initial finance law. 
Furthermore, according to the government, the implementation of the PND required 
modifications to certain provisions of the general tax code. For the period 2018-2020, 
the PND was based on three axes with a total cost of US$ 8.3 bn, 65% of which were 
expected to be mobilized from the private sector.  
 
In its end of mission report, released on 19 December, the IMF attested the Togolese 
government a firm economic recovery, with economic growth estimated to have 
accelerated from 4.9 % in 2018 to 5.3 % in 2019 and probable 5.5 % in 2020. 
Furthermore, the IMF confirmed a significant reduction of the budget deficit and 
public debt which had increased from 43.2% of GDP at end 2011 to 77% of GDP at 
end 2018 but was still above the maximum public debt stock of 70% of GDP 
recommended by UEMOA. However, fiscal deficit reduction is limited owing to the 
continuing tense socio-political situation, which will warrant also higher security 
spending.  
 
The IMF confirmed that structural reforms are progressing, including the creation and 
harmonization of tax identification numbers, tele-procedures to reduce compliance 
costs, provisional deposits to secure revenue collections, internal controls against 
corruption, and reduction of tax exemptions. The IMF furthermore emphasised that a 
prequalification notice for the privatization of the two public banks had been announced 
in international financial news outlets and that the prequalification process is underway. 
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 Togo’s imports from Russia amounted to US$ 48,53 m (2016) and US$ 30,10 m (2017), and exports to 
US$ 5 m each for 2106 and 2017.  
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 Togo’s imports from India amounted to US$ 48,29 m (2016) , US$ 57,53 m (2017) and its exports to 
US$ 132,26 (2016), US$ 145,54 m (2017) and US$ 282,70 m (2018). 
Author’s extended and hyperlinked version of: Kohnert, D. (2020): Togo. In: Adetula & Kamski & Mehler & Melber 
(eds.), Africa Yearbook. Vol. 16 – Politics, economy and society South of the Sahara in 2019. Leiden & Boston: Brill  
 
 19 
It underlined that it was essential to finalize the reforms in these two public banks to 
safeguard financial stability and minimize risks to the State budget, considering that 
non-performing loans in the banking sector remain high. Last, but not least the IMF 
lauded a highly commendable progress to improve the business environment as proven 
by the latest Doing Business Indicators according to which Togo is ranking amongst 
the best-reforming countries in the World although it remained well below that of its 
UEMOA regional peers. This could constrain Togo's ability to attract sufficient FDI 
which could induce the government to resort again to debt-financed infrastructure 
development. The shortfall would be financed by FDI and external loans. Widespread 
corruption and concerns about the protection of property rights could aggravate these 
problems. 
 
  
Economist Intelligence Unit, London, EIU, 3/19, p. 26 
 
From 4 to 17 December the IMF delegation discussed the sixth and final review of the 
program supported by IMF’s Extended Credit Facility (ECF) with the Togolese 
authorities. They concluded that growth was mainly driven primarily by domestic 
demand, while some export sectors showed signs of weaknesses. According to the 
provisions as of end-September, credit to the private sector expanded by 3.6 % p.a. and 
inflation stood at 0.4 % p.a. The fiscal consolidation, which had started in 2017, 
remained sustained with the overall fiscal deficit estimated at 2.2 % of GDP.  
 
Togo also joined the G20 Compact with Africa initiative. However, for many 
potential investors, compact countries like Togo are too small to be of any interest. 
Togo did not receive any private foreign infrastructure funding after the CwA launch 
according to the PPI database (May 2019). 
 
On 21 October, the Minister of Economy and Finance, Sani Yaya, deplored the high-
risk investment structures operating illegally in Togo and ordered them to immediately 
cease their activities. According to him these fundraising structures irregularly collect 
funds from the public against equity or investment securities by promising returns of up 
to 360% of the initial stake and annual interest rates of around 90 % on investments. 
They cast a damning light on the 200 formal microfinance initiatives, with ca. 500 
service points nationwide. These initiatives were assisted by the Association 
Professionelle des Institutions de Microfinance du Togo (APIM-Togo) which was 
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created in 2004 to promote the development of the microfinance industry in Togo. In 
October, the government banned 7 microfinance structures.  
 
On 26 March the government launched a two-year project (January 2019-December 
2020) "promoting the rights to sexual health and the local integration of refugees and 
the population", financed by German aid to the tune of 500,000 €. The project, based on 
an initiative of the Togolese Association for Family Welfare (ATBEF), aimed to seek a 
lasting solution for refugees and host populations in Togo through their socio-economic 
integration by working to strengthen the mechanisms of local integration, health care 
and protection of refugees. It was focused on five localities in the Maritime region with 
3,128 refugees and 9,500 members of host communities.  
 
In August, the government expropriated more than 10,000 hectares in the Zio river 
flood valley (North of Lomé) in order to protect the population against the harmful 
effects of recurrent floods, as experienced during the scourges in 2008, 2010, 2012. The 
area had been classified as a "non-building area" already by the Master Plan and Urban 
Planning (PDU ) of Lomé in 1981. But the populations had continue to erect precarious 
habitats there, subject to recurrent floods. On 340 hectares of the area, the Rural 
Development Project of the Djagblé plain was being implemented. 
 
The 2019 transhumance campaign review, presented at a conference from 16 to 17 
December in Blitta, revealed for the transhumance-period 2019, there had been no 
deadly conflicts as in 2018 and 2017, but only 8 minor incidents. In total 10,370 head of 
cattle had been registered for a tax collection of F CFA 56,548,000 (€ 86,206).  
 
Illicit African gold exports came in the spotlight on 29 May. Although in Togo there is 
hardly any domestic gold production, it was listed as the seventh-largest source gold 
exports to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which indicated significant illicit cross-
border movement of gold, probably from Ghana, a key source of gold for the UAE, 
including illegal mining.  
 
Economic Freedom, as measured by the Heritage Foundation’s Economic Freedom 
Index 2019 improved slightly by 2.5 points to 50.3, making it's economy the 158th 
freest in the 2019 Index. This was due to improvement in fiscal health and rising scores 
for the tax burden and property rights. Togo ranked 35th among 47 countries in the Sub-
Saharan Africa region, and its overall score was below the regional and world averages. 
In short, Togo’s economic freedom too remained with the overall status of ‘mostly 
unfree’.  
 
 
 
